These are patches I received in the Navy in the 1980’s. The bottom one is for Special Boat Unit 20, where I was stationed in 1986/87, and the one on top is for SERE (Survival, Evasion,Resistance & Escape) School which I attended in – it must have been - October of 1986.
The Navy sent us to SERE School because as members of a small boat crew, our odds of being captured by the enemy are higher than if we were, say, on the crew of a destroyer. The Navy also used to send all flight crews through SERE training for the same reason, and I presume it still does.
That brings me to the incident this week with the Iranians.
Allen West is starting to ask the right questions:
First of all, I find it odd that these Riverine craft were operating on an excursion from Kuwait to Bahrain. Why were they not hugging close to the coast line? Now, I also find it perplexing to be told that the engines of the boats malfunctioned. If that were the case, an immediate call should have been made and at least, aerial surveillance and support should have been dispatched. The next thing would have been immediate dispatching of a recovery vessel to support these two boats. Regardless of one or two boat engines malfunctioning, what should have happened after a distress call was all hands manning the boat weapons. They should have been in an immediate defensive posture to secure themselves until recovery was complete — or they were back underway.
I find it rather disturbing that any Iranian watercraft were able to approach these two heavily armored assault boats. My question would be, was the on-board radar equipment operable? If so, then the approaching enemy craft would have been detected. That being the case, the officer in charge should have reported contact, verified that they were not friendly, and taken action to defend his position, his boats. That means warning shots should have been fired, if not heeded, and then the full power of these assault boats levied against the enemy watercraft — with situation reports being sent to higher command. We need to know why exactly those actions were not taken — and if the young officer in charge was told to not take any action. And if so, by whom.
Read the whole thing. Especially note the Code of Conduct for American military personnel (which is also repeated at the SERE School link above). Allen West is right. There is nothing about this incident, as portrayed so far, that makes any sense whatsoever. I take it as a given the Iranians are lying about it. But I would really like to know why our own Navy is lying. The story cannot be what we have been told so far.
For what it’s worth, the story is evidently no longer interesting enough to even be on the Washington Post home page this morning, and the New York Times imbecilicly reports it as some sort of diplomatic success.